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The transition from authoritarian rule to a stable democracy is a long and often fragile process. Elites and the public must accept and trust the institutions of democracy-and political parties are among the vital institutions of democracy. As others at this conference argue, elections are central to the democratic process, and political parties are the prime actors in electoral politics. Parties play a dominant role in structuring the political debate in most nations; they are the chief organizations that field candidates and compete for public office; and ultimately, parties form and structure the functioning of government in most democracies.
Our contribution to this discussion of parties and political development focuses on public attachments to parties as a prime measure of party system development and thus the development of a democratic polity. In established democracies, party images are a cognitive mechanism for orienting oneself to politics. The American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960) first established the role of long-term psychological predispositions-party identifications-in guiding citizen action. Partisanship provides a heuristic to organize the complexities of politics, integrating information into a political belief system, and evaluating political phenomena. Partisanship also guides political action, ranging from the decision to participate in politics to a voting choice in an election. Since the original findings of Campbell and his colleagues, a vast literature has demonstrated the importance of party attachments as a central element of democratic politics (Budge et al. 1976; Miller 1991; Holmberg 1994; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002) . Thus, in a recent review of the literature on party identification, Weisberg and Greene (2003: 115) state "Party identification is the linchpin of our modern understanding of electoral democracy, and it is likely to retain that crucial theoretical position."
Partisan loyalties may play an even greater role in transitional and consolidating democracies. The development of partisanship indicates a citizen's attachment to a key institution that integrates them into the new democratic political order. For instance, research on postwar German public opinion treated the growth of partisanship as a sign of developing ties to the new democratic system (Baker et al. 1981; Norpoth 1978) .
Similarly, research on emerging or consolidating democracies has examined whether citizens are developing partisan identities in post-Socialist societies (McDonough et al. 1998; Miller et al. 2000; Toka 1998; Kaase and Klingemann 1994) or in Latin American democracies (Mainwaring 1999; Hagopian 1998 ).
Partisan ties also have great heuristic value in a new democracy, enabling citizen to orient themselves to this new political world, evaluate political actors, and make political choices. The development of partisanship also can indicate a transformation in mass loyalties from the individual politicians who created the new political system to more enduring party organizations. For instance, the institutionalization of the French Fifth Republic was partially dependent on the transfer of attachments from Charles DeGaulle as an individual to Gaullism as a political identity. In other words, partisanship can signify the institutionalization of political loyalties from a charismatic leader to a political organization that transcends a specific person.
In addition to its value to the individual citizen, the aggregate development of partisanship has broad systemic effects. The Michigan scholars argued widespread partisanship was a stabilizing force for a political system. For instance, high levels of partisanship should dampen electoral volatility and encourage an equilibrium process in electoral politics. Similarly, Converse and Dupeux (1962) held that the potential for voters to support "flash" parties and demagogic leaders-such as the 1950s Poujadists in France or the supporters of Stanislaw Tyminski in the 1990 Polish presidential electionis greater when many citizens fail to identify with one of the established parties. Thus, systems in which many voters lack long-term partisan attachments are more vulnerable to wide election fluctuations and the appeals of charismatic/demagogic candidates. In addition, Almond and Verba (1963: 86) wrote that "Open and moderate partisanship, then, are essential to a stable democracy. They are the 'feeling correlates' of responsible majority and loyal opposition."
The classic model of partisanship presumed that party attachments were a predictable feature of established democratic party systems, and once established partisanship would be a persisting feature of a mature party system. Thus partisanship was one indicator of party system and democratic development.
However, there is mounting evidence of a general erosion of party attachments in advanced industrial democracies over the past few decades-a pattern directly contradictory to the classic partisanship model (Dalton 2004; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Clarke and Stewart 1998) . This dealignment pattern has been linked to the diminishing value of partisanship in contemporary politics. The mass media fulfill many of the information functions once performed by political parties; citizen groups are active in interest articulation; and parties recruit fewer members. In addition, many better educated citizens no longer feel the need to rely on habitual party ties as a guide to their behavior (Dalton 2000) . In other words, the empirical evidence suggests that having followed a trajectory of the development of mass party systems and popular attachments to parties, Western democracies are now experiencing a new political context where party systems and partisanship are weakening.
The dealignment thesis is primarily applied to the advanced industrial democracies as a consequence of their socioeconomic development, but there is also some evidence that these dealigning forces are now present in less developed societies. Hagogian (1998) has described a similar dealignment trend for a set of other Latin American democracies, and Mainwaring (2005; 1999) has shown that electoral volatility remains high in many new democracies. The time period for post-communist societies of Eastern Europe is shorter, but the evidence of strengthening party ties is also ambiguous (Miller et al. 2000) .
This research on developing nations suggests that many of the factors weakening partisanship in advanced industrial democracies may also be affecting new democracies (Sánchez 2003; van Biezen 2003; Mainwaring 1999 and the causal processes that shape the development of these partisan ties.
Measuring Partisanship
The early analyses of the Michigan election studies demonstrated that partisanship was a central element in the political identities of Americans (Campbell et al. 1960 (Campbell et al. , 1966 .
Since then, however, an on-going debate has questioned whether the concept of party identification can be exported to other democratic party systems (e.g., Butler and Stokes 1969; Budge, Crewe and Farlie 1976; Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt 1981; Richardson 1991) . Researchers noted that other party systems lacked some of the features that gave party identification its analytic power and conceptual basis in the United States. For instance, the concept of a "partisan independent" is a standard piece of the American political vocabulary, but this self-identification is not common in many other nations. Table 1 displays the percent of the public in each nation who say they are close to a political party across both modules of the CSES. 5 There is considerable variation in the degree of partisanship across nations, ranging from the vast majority of the public in Australia to barely any partisans in the two non-democracies in this set, Hong Kong and
Belarus. Across the nations in module I, only 46 percent of the public claims to be close to any political party. Across a somewhat different set of nations in module II, 48 percent are partisans.
As a subjective identity, partisanship is a difficult concept to measure. Part of the variation across nations may reflect political traditions about the expression of partisanship, or current sympathy toward political parties and party systems (Dalton and Weldon 2004) . In a few cases, nations also used a differently worded question to be consistent with their national trend question. 6 We also suspect that the translation of partisanship into multiple languages will generate some variation. Thus, we are cautious about the interpretation of any single national case from these data. 7 Instead, we will focus our attention on broad cross-national patterns, and in testing the sources of partisanship with these data. = = = Table 1 goes about here = = = Even from these initial distributions, several factors seem to encourage partisanship at the aggregate level. Consistent with a social learning model described below, citizens in established democracies are more likely to express a partisanship attachment (54 percent) than citizens in new democracies (37 percent) for the Module I nations. These patterns are broadly consistent with the thesis that partisanship is a measure of the institutionalization of a party system. These results encourage us to probe more deeply into the factors creating these partisan attachments.
A Social Learning Model
Although each nation has its own unique partisan history, previous research has stressed a general social learning theory that assembles the elements of national experiences into a single model. Philip Converse's (1969) demonstrated that a majority of pre-voting age children already share the party predispositions of their parents. Converse calls this the "partisan push" that is socialized by the parental generation.
Second, once individuals are eligible to vote and enter the electorate, in stable party systems their experiences typically reinforce their early predispositions. With ageor more precisely with repeated electoral support of one's preferred party-partisan attachments tend to stabilize and strengthen over time (Converse 1976; Jennings and Markus 1984) . Thus, research regularly finds a strong relationship between age and partisan attachment in advanced democracies (Converse 1969 (Converse , 1976 Dalton 2000) .
However, the social learning model has different implications for new democracies. Typically, these citizens can expect little "partisan push" from their parents; Another example was postwar Germany, where research found a weak parental push since older voters themselves had only weak party ties, but a gradual increase in partisanship with continued experience in the new electoral system (Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt 1981, 221-229; Norpoth 1978) . This social learning model has empirical predictions for cross-national research on partisanship. The model implies that partisanship will be stronger in older democracies, where both the socialization and life-cycle processes have been functioning. This is broadly consistent with the cross-national patterns displayed in Table 1 . In addition, the model presumes that age groups whose first electoral experience is delayed beyond the normal age of enfranchisement are subject to a "resistance" factor when they do begin to participate. This resistance factor applies primarily to citizens who came of age in a non-democratic political system, and only began voting in later life. In addition, Swiss women received a delayed franchise (starting in 1970) in the oldest age cohorts. Following Converse's initial analyses, we computed electoral experience of each cohort in each nation, adjusted to take these factors into account.
The index of accumulated electoral experience, I e , primarily reflects the social learning during the life cycle that a cohort experiences. Cross-national differences in accumulated learning also represent the variation between new and established democracies.
The second variable in the model captures the effects of parental socialization.
The operationalization of this index of parental push, I p , is rather straightforward. The impact of the parents is calculated as equal to the accumulated electoral experience (I e ) of the parents when individuals were 15 years of age.
The index of parental push, I p , may not appear so, but it primarily reflects crossnational differences in the longevity of party systems. Further diagnostics led to another adjustment of the analysis. Even beyond the effects of the turnout adjustment of I e , it appeared that nations with systems of compulsory voting had higher levels of partisanship. We reasoned that compulsory rules encouraged citizens to be more engaged in elections, even if they eventually did not vote.
Adding a measure of compulsory voting rules, this variable also emerged as statistically significant in Model III. There is additional variation that is unexplained in this model, although we suspect we are approaching the explanatory limits of these data. Thus, as a final diagnostic we calculated residuals from Model III and correlated these with other potential predictors.
For instance, a classification of old/new democracies is essentially unrelated to these residuals (r = .034) because this factor is already embedded in our measures of I e and I p .
The residuals also suggested that partisanship was weaker in surveys conducted in elections that were only for president (without parallel legislative elections). One might hypothesize that the limited final choices in many presidential elections left supporters of many parties without a candidate of their party to support. There was a weak negative correlation between president-only elections and the partisan residuals (-.168). We also examined whether fractionalized multiparty systems might limit party learning; but the correlation between the effective number of parties and partisan residuals was modest (-.084). Finally, we considered a methodological artifact of the CSES survey; three surveys prompted the respondent with specific party labels as part of a revised partisanship question (Australia and the New Zealand survey in Module II). Such prompts typically increase levels of partisanship, and this effect is stronger than the others we considered (r=.181). We did not estimate additional models with these variables, but they suggest other residual factors that may be influencing partisanship beyond the social learning model.
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Old versus New Democracies
The analytic power of the social learning model provides a framework for understanding Table 3 shows the result of the model applied only to established democracies (the old guard variable drops out because this does not apply to any established democracies). In established democracies, the social learning model works to strengthen partisanship with repeated electoral experience (I e coefficient = .005) and across generations (I p coefficient = .003), although both of these effects are weaker than in the model for all nations. This is not due to the restricted variance in partisan experiences in established democracies; the parental push measure has limited variance in established democracies, but the electoral experience variable has considerable variance. Moreover, the unstandardized coefficients are less affected by the variance of predictors. Rather, these results imply that partisan learning is weaker in established democracies than for our overall set of nations. = = = Table 3 goes about here = = = Applying this model to the new democracies yields much stronger estimates of partisan learning. When individuals accumulate electoral experience, it much more strongly translates into partisan attachments (I e coefficient = .022); this is four times greater than the relationship in established democracies. Similarly, when there is partisan transfer across generations, the impact in forming party ties is substantially stronger than in the established democracies (I p coefficient = .015). The existence of old guard parties from the previous regime is also a strong stimulant for partisanship. Because of these stronger effects, we now explain over half the total variance in cohort partisanship.
At first glance, these results may appear paradoxical. They imply that citizens in new democracies are learning partisanship at a faster rate than in established
democracies-yet we saw in Table 1 and Figure 1 that partisanship is stronger in established democracies and the age gradient is steeper in established democracies. The explanation is quite simple. In established democracies the citizens have much more opportunity to accumulate electoral learning-both from their parents (I p ) and from their own repeated experience in elections (I e) . Thus, when we add both components together (I p and I e ), there is a steady and large increase in years of electoral experience among older cohorts in established democracies. This is portrayed in Figure 2 , which plots the total of I p and I e by age for the cohorts in the established democracies of the CSES project. Averaged across all age groups, publics in established democracies have a total of 27 years of electoral experience, which translates into higher levels of partisanship. there have been cycles of democratic and non-democratic regimes, which restrains the accumulation of partisan learning; the resistance factor in the learning model means that when democracy is reinstated much of the earlier partisan experience has been lost. Thus, the lower line in Figure 2 indicates that the total electoral experience of cohorts in new democracies shows very little difference by age. And compared to the established democracies, publics in new democracies average only 5 years of total electoral experience (I p and I e ), which translates into their low levels of partisanship.
Partisanship and Democracy
We began our analyses based on the premise that party ties are important in binding individuals to the democratic process and in providing a heuristic for managing the complexities of democratic citizenship. In simple terms, we were repeating Schattschneider's dictum that democracy with parties-or partisanship-is unthinkable.
Yet, portions of the recent literature points to the erosion of partisanship in both established and new democracies. While such developments might be a sign of the maturation of party systems and electorates in advanced industrial democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) , the lack of party ties would be a more onerous sign for newly emerging and consolidating democracies that are trying to institutionalize democratic politics and party systems.
By studying partisanship within the framework of the social learning theory that
Converse proposed, empirical analysis of partisanship in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project provides insights into these processes of partisan learning and dealignment. For the established democracies, there is evidence that partisan learning is weakening. Part of the evidence is the aggregate erosion of partisanship over the later third of the 20 th century (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) . In addition, our model finds that the impact of parental socialization and electoral experience is weaker in established democracies (compared to new democracies) and apparently weaker than these same processes a generation ago.
Fewer individuals in new democracies hold party attachments, and this is demonstrated in both the CSES data and other analyses. One concern is that national conditions will restrict the learning of partisanship as these nations attempt to consolidate their new democratic system, with negative consequences for the party system and the democratic process. This presents a bit of a chicken and the egg problem: partisanship will strengthen in new democracies when there are stable democratic party systems, but stable democratic party systems are partially built on widespread partisanship. Still, we see this as an optimistic potential for new democracies. If elites can build a functioning democratic party system, then partisanship should follow. The difficulty will be in building and sustaining democratic elections-but if it they build it, the citizens will come. 
Endnotes 1
Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2004: 256-61) suggest that Africa may not fit this pattern. Using a similar measure of partisanship they find relatively high levels of attachments in Africa, and attribute it to the parties' conscious efforts to mobilize the public and the lack of other civil society groups. 2 We think one of the most valid measures is used in the German election studies which encapsulates the meaning of partisanship in the question. It asks "Many people in the Federal Republic lean toward a particular party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. How about you: do you in general lean toward a particular party? [If yes} Taken altogether, how strongly or weakly do you lean toward this party, very strongly, fairly strongly, moderately, fairly weakly, or very weakly?" Barnes et al. (1988) did an extensive comparison of the traditional American party identification question and a party closeness question that were both asked in the Political Action panel study. They found high correlations between both measures at two timepoints (r=.85 and .88) and general consistency in the patterns and correlates of both questions.
5
When two surveys of a single nation were included in a module, the results were averaged. We also excluded the Belgian data from module I because it is based on a noncomparable party preference question. The New Zealand campaign subset was not included from Module I; we used only the post-election responses. We utilized only the German telephone survey in 2002 and excluded the mailback questionnaire data that seemed to overinflate partisanship (and other variables). A preliminary release of the British CSES supplement allowed us to include it in Table 1 , but British data are not part of the CSES merged file and thus are not included in the cohort analyses.
9
The figure codes respondents into three year age groups, starting with 18-20 and ending with 75-77. The age variable in the Peruvian surveys did not allow for such recoding, so they are not included in these analyses.
10
Most of the dates of initial democratic election are clear-cut, and for old democracies the exact date does not matter because all respondents have grown up in a democratic environment. However, in a few nations there is not a consensus on the date of the first democratic election. In our study, we coded the first elections as: 1988 for Mexico, and 1992 for Taiwan (1992) . For Chile (1935 ), Brazil (1945 ), South Korea (1960 ), and Thailand (1969 , after the initial instiution of democracy there were significant periods where democracy was interrupted by authoritarian rule.
11
The turnout statistics were taken from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2002: 80) . In addition, because the young are less likely to vote, Converse estimated that younger cohorts accumulate electoral experience at a slower rate than older age groups. Our exploratory analyses suggest that this adjustment was unlikely to have a major impact in the CSES data. So this correction is not used in the analyses presented here.
12
The statistics in Table 1 excluded 'don't know' and other missing data responses, and this process was followed in calculating cohort partisanship. In addition, we reran the analyses including 'don't know' responses as non-partisanships, and obtained essentially similar results.
13
Some of the nations in Table 1 were not included in our cohort analyses on methodological reasons. The Netherlands was not included because it did not ask the standard CSES question. Peru was not included because the collapsed age coding did not allow us to generate cohorts comparable to the other nations. In addition, we did not include the Ukraine, which has a higher level of partisanship than found in other cross-national surveys (e.g., Miller et al. 2000) and required a dummy variable in all the models described below. Instead of retaining this dummy variable for a single nation, we excluded the Ukrainian case. This yields 57 surveys with 11 age cohorts each, or 627 datapoints (57 * 11).
14
The nations coded for a continuity of old guard parties are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Taiwan.
15
We created a four category variable based on data reported by IDEA: 1) no laws, 2) potential social repercussions (Mexico), 3) weak enforcement (as in Brazil and Chile), and 4) strict enforcement (Australia and Belgium).
16
The nations with the largest residuals (over +/-.15) were: Australia (.16), Israel (.16), USA (.15), Ireland (-.18), Belarus (-.19), Chile (-.20), Hong Kong (-.24) and Belgium (-.29). Most of the systematic residual variance seems linked to national conditions, which implies that national circumstances also affect partisanship. The eta correlation between nation and residuals is .85; but the difficulty is to define this variation in systematic terms. This might involve the continuity of parties within a nation, the culture of partisanship, or the translation of the partisanship questions in the CSES survey.
